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Introduction
On November 22, 2005, CNN reported that an unmarried preschool
teacher at St. Rose of Lima Catholic School in Queens, New York, had
become pregnant and was fired from her first teaching position.1 Michelle
McCusker appeared on national news that night at a press conference,
crying about losing her first job just a week after she told her employer that
she was pregnant. In its coverage, CNN showed McCusker’s letter of
termination, which stated, "[a] teacher cannot violate the tenets of Catholic
morality. . . . [T]ermination of contract must occur."2 Some journalists
called her behavior "shameless" and said that she should have
"acknowledged the justice of the school’s position, and resigned."3 Others
supported the school’s position, suggesting that it "fired her because a
visibly pregnant and unmarried authority figure dealing with young
children is conveying a message . . . that the church does not want to
send."4 The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)5 took on
McCusker’s case and asserted that under current law, no private school will
ever have a legitimate legal reason to fire a pregnant woman who is
unmarried because of her supposedly immoral actions outside the
classroom.6
1. Fired Teacher Sues (CNN Television Broadcast Nov. 22, 2005) (transcript on file
with author).
2. Id.
3. Carol Platt Liebau, Sexual Morality Is Lost in New York, HUMAN EVENTS (July 28,
2009), http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=10580 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
4. John Leo, The Case of Michelle McCusker, TOWNHALL (July 28, 2009),
http://townhall.com/columnists/JohnLeo/2005/12/05/the_case_of_michelle_mccusker
(on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
5. The NYCLU is the New York State affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU).
6. NYCLU Defends Pregnant School Teacher Fired by School, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES
(Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-defends-pregnant-school-teacher-fired-
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This Note will investigate and ultimately support the position of the
NYCLU, citing to cases from multiple circuits while exploring the genesis
and development of pregnancy discrimination claims over the past fifty
years. Part I will describe Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title VII’s amendment to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978. That Part will explain how plaintiff women work within the
framework of Title VII to establish a claim, and how defendant schools can
defeat an accusation of pregnancy discrimination. Part II will discuss the
religious entities exceptions to Title VII, highlighting the inconsistent
application and problematic broadening of the ministerial exception and
other exemptions. In Part III, this Note will explain the troublesome
application of the "bona fide occupational qualification" standard to
teachers in religious schools, with schools claiming that a teacher either
failed to abide by a moral code or failed to serve as an appropriate role
model. Finally, in Part IV, this Note will conclude by stating that none of
these loopholes that schools use to escape liability under Title VII should be
applied to cases involving pregnancy discrimination, because teachers—
who are largely not ministers—cannot be treated equally, without regard to
sex, in enforcing a policy that disproportionately targets those with swelling
abdomens.
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act
A. The Route to Equality: An Historical Background
Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some employers
regularly discriminated against women. Patriarchal norms permitted
employers to pigeonhole women into stereotypically female professions or
to prohibit them from performing stereotypically male jobs.7 The U.S.
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 to remedy and
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
school [hereinafter NYCLU Defends] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
7. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later,
45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359 (2009).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (2010).
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1.

To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or

2.

To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
9
origin.

Congress’ enacting Title VII was a great success for women, but the
law did not combat the employment discrimination teachers often faced if
they became pregnant.10 If a pregnant teacher was not terminated without
hesitation or did not resign, then she could be pushed into a mandatory
pregnancy leave that was much longer than necessary and did not hold her
job.11 School boards unhesitatingly dismissed teachers who were pregnant,
particularly if they were unmarried, and based their decisions on both
student-centered and teacher-centered reasoning.12 They claimed that
pregnant, unmarried teachers would have a poor moral influence on
students, while at the same time they paternalistically sought to protect
women from "giggling schoolchildren."13 Women were discriminated
against because of their pregnancies and had no available legal remedy for
their problem.14

9. 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(1)–(2).
10. See generally Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 350–59 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (providing an historical background of the changing roles of women in society,
shifting sexual mores, and the role of religion in both).
11. Susan A. Kidwell, Note, Pregnancy Discrimination in Educational Institutions: A
Proposal to Amend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1288
(2001).
12. Id. at 1290–91 ("With respect to the mandatory leave policies, the Court
recognized the liberty interest of teachers who decide to bear children but also
acknowledged legitimate state interests in maintaining continuity in the classroom and
protecting the health of teachers and their unborn children.").
13. Id. at 1291 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9
(1974)).
14. See id. at 1303 (describing the lack of legal remedy for the pregnant teachers when
the employers were able to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their
discriminatory action because any reasonable proffered explanation was enough to warrant
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim).
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Twelve years after Title VII was enacted, General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert,15 brought pregnancy discrimination to the attention of the nation.
In this case, the Supreme Court found that pregnancy discrimination did not
constitute sex discrimination and hence was not prohibited by Title VII.16
The Court rejected an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.) guideline that would have brought pregnancy discrimination
under Title VII’s protective umbrella.17 Instead, it found that General
Electric’s insurance policy did not inherently discriminate against women
in failing to cover pregnancy-related claims because those claims were only
a few of the many denied without regard to sex.18 Justice Brennan strongly
dissented, stating that "the E.E.O.C.’s construction of sex discrimination
under § 703(a)(1) is fully consonant with the ultimate objective of Title VII,
‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered (sexually) [sic]
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of (women) [sic].’"19
Congress, agreeing with Justice Brennan’s view, "unambiguously
expressed its disapproval"20 with Gilbert and amended Title VII through the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)21 two years later, in 1978. The PDA
describes discrimination based on pregnancy as included within the

15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
16. See id. at 138 ("[I]t is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in
this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits . . . .").
17. See id. at 140–41 (citing to the E.E.O.C. guideline). That E.E.O.C. guideline is as
follows:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment. . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
temporary disabilities.
29 CFR § 1604.10(b) (1975).
18. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138–39 ("[G]ender-based discrimination does not result
simply because an employer’s disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive.").
19. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); see also Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with
Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 819, 819–20
(2001) (analyzing the intended meaning of Title VII with respect to sex discrimination).
20. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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statutory description of discrimination based on sex.22 In subsequent
decisions, courts consistently ruled that the PDA made it illegal for
pregnant women to be fired on the basis of their pregnancies alone.23
Because of the PDA, pregnant women finally had a legal response to the
discrimination their predecessors had experienced for decades.
B. Establishing a Claim: McDonnell Douglas and Burden Shifting
Even before a teacher alleging pregnancy discrimination has an
opportunity to establish her prima facie case, the defendant school has a
chance to file a motion that could remove the case from the purview of Title
VII, and thus potentially from the reach of the court system. The defendant
could file for summary judgment, arguing that the "ministerial exception" to
Title VII prevents the court from interfering with the school’s hiring and
firing of ministers, and claiming that the plaintiff serves a ministerial
function.24 Alternatively, the defendant school could argue in a summary
judgment motion that the court’s Title VII analysis is prohibited because
other religious exemptions to Title VII25 disqualify the courts from
examining the reasons behind a religious organization’s employment
decisions. If the court decides that the plaintiff was not a "minister," or that
an organization’s employment decision was based on a religious tenet but
was not so religiously grounded that examination for pretext would involve
22. The text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is as follows:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
23. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) (denying a
defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment on a pregnancy discrimination claim).
In denying the motion, the court stated that "[Congress] designed the PDA specifically to
address the stereotype that ‘women are less desirable employees because they are liable to
become pregnant,’ . . . and to insure that the decision whether to work while pregnant ‘was
reserved for each individual woman to make for herself.’" Id. (citations omitted).
24. See generally Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a
Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (2008) (examining the scope and
applicability of the ministerial exception to Title VII cases).
25. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365–67 (9th Cir.
1986) (describing the scope of Title VII’s religious exemptions).
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excessive entanglement between government and the religious entity, then
the plaintiff’s claim may proceed past summary judgment.26
In order to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, however, the
plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,27 established a test for all Title
VII discrimination cases that is used to determine whether the plaintiff
has proven her prima facie case.28 As specifically applied to
pregnancy discrimination, the four prongs of the McDonnell Douglas
test are:
1.

The plaintiff must prove that she was pregnant; and

2.

She must prove that she was meeting the requirements of
her job; and

3.

She must prove that she was terminated, or otherwise
suffered an adverse employment action; and

4.

She must prove that the circumstances of her termination
29
give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Often in pregnancy discrimination cases involving single teachers
at sectarian schools, the defendant school will argue that the plaintiff
was terminated for failure to fulfill the second prong of the analysis.
Schools argue that a teacher’s conforming to a particular moral code of
conduct or serving as a role model was a condition of the teacher’s
employment, or "bona-fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ).30
Ultimately, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving all four points, then the
burden of proof shifts to the employer, who must proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.31
In a pregnancy discrimination case involving a sectarian school,
the school will typically argue that it is exempt from the
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a
four-prong evidentiary framework for employment discrimination cases filed under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
28. See id. (enumerating the prongs of the test)
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(describing the school’s argument that plaintiff, a teacher, failed to meet the BFOQ of
adherence to a particular code of religious conduct and was terminated because of this
failure).
31. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56 (1981)
(articulating the nature of the burden of proof that shifts to the defendant).
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nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII through one of a variety of
religious exceptions.32 If the defendant is able to prove that the
plaintiff teacher is a ministerial employee—i.e., an employee whose
job involves "ministering" to her students—then the court will not
examine the religious justification behind the plaintiff’s termination
and will not allow the plaintiff to attempt to prove that such a
justification was pretextual; thus, the litigation ceases.33 If the
defendant instead claims another religious exemption from Title VII,
the plaintiff "may not challenge the plausibility of putative religious
purposes. A fact finder will necessarily have to presume that an
asserted religious motive is plausible in the sense that it is reasonably
or validly held."34 Though the plaintiff may not challenge the
legitimacy of the stated religious reason for the adverse employment
action, in some circuits she may claim that the stated reason is
pretextual, focusing on "factual questions such as whether the asserted
reason for the challenged action comports with the defendant’s policies
and rules, whether the rule applied to the plaintiff has been applied
uniformly, and whether the putative non-discriminatory purpose was
stated only after the allegation of discrimination."35
If the plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant’s stated religious
reason for termination is in fact pretextual, and that the defense’s given
reason is only an excuse for termination when the actual reason is
discriminatory, then the plaintiff will likely win her case.
In
pregnancy discrimination cases, plaintiffs often accomplish this by
proving that, while the defendant’s stated reason for termination was
facially non-discriminatory, the proffered reason was not enforced
equally across the sexes.36 Though this might seem a fairly simple way
for a case to progress, the legal history of trials dealing with pregnant
32. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211,
219 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The Court . . . noted that Congress had carved out exceptions to the
Controlled Substances Act for peyote use, possession, and transportation by all members of
recognized Indian tribes.").
33. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167
(4th Cir. 1985) ("Ecclesiastical decisions are generally inviolate; civil courts are bound to
accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical
polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
34. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. Id.
36. See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
("Religious codes of morality must be applied equally to male and female teachers.").
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unwed women in religious schools has become far more complex than
one might expect.
II. Religious Entities’ Exceptions to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Often a religious school facing a pregnancy discrimination suit will
claim that its decision to terminate a pregnant employee was not pregnancy
discrimination, but discrimination on the basis of religion.37 If the actions
of the school indeed constituted permissible religious discrimination, and
this defense is not pretextual, then the school may in fact be excused from
abiding by Title VII through an exception.38
A. The Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception, which derives from the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment,39 prevents a court from
scrutinizing a religious organization’s employment decisions regarding its
ministers under Title VII.40 In plain terms, when a religious organization
persuades a court that the person it terminated functioned as a minister, then
the former employee cannot argue that the former employer discriminated
against him or her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.41 The reasoning behind this exception is understandable: because
ministers act as the "lifeblood" of the religious institution and represent the
religious institution to its people, the institution should not be limited in
employment decisions concerning ministers.42 In addition, when a religious
organization takes an adverse employment action against one of its
37. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007).
38. See id. at 1975 (explaining that "[t]his autonomy covers all aspects of the
ministerial employment relationship, not just hiring and firing" (emphasis added)).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .").
40. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–61 (5th Cir. 1972)
(establishing the ministerial exception by holding that the application of Title VII to a
religious organization’s employment decision regarding its ministers would violate the First
Amendment).
41. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1975–76 (observing that religious organizations
maintain complete discretion regarding the employment of their ministers despite a number
of anti-discrimination statutes).
42. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59.
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ministers, it is not required to articulate a legitimate "religious"
justification.43 The Fifth Circuit has consistently reasoned that "we cannot
conceive how the federal judiciary could determine whether an employment
decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate
grounds without inserting ourselves into a realm where the Constitution
forbids us to tread, the internal management of a church."44 Thus, courts
give great deference to churches with respect to their employment decisions
concerning ministers. Additionally, ministerial employees do not have to be
employed by churches; rather, universities, religious schools, and hospitals
might hire and fire such "ministers."45 Regardless of the employer, if a
court decides that an employee is serving in a ministerial capacity, that
decision is outcome determinative: the employer will almost always
prevail.46
These policy justifications came to the forefront of analysis in
McClure v. Salvation Army,47 the 1972 case in which the Fifth Circuit
created the ministerial exception to Title VII, stating that "government lacks
the constitutional power to regulate discriminatory employment practices
by a religious entity against one of its ministers."48 In that case, the court
held that a female minister was barred from bringing a Title VII claim
against her church, because a central guarantee of the religion clauses is to
give churches the "power to decide for themselves . . . matters of church
governance as well as those of faith and doctrine."49 Title VII was
inapplicable to the church/minister relationship, because its application to
ministerial employment decisions "would result in an encroachment by the
43. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act
of a decision rather than a motivation behind it").
44. Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343,
350 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibited
the court from applying Title VII to a church’s decision to terminate a member of its clergy).
45. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1976 (noting that courts have interpreted the term
"minister" broadly).
46. See id. at 2038 ("As applied by the lower courts, the ministerial exemption
currently grants religious organizations full immunity from [employment discrimination]
claims brought by ministerial employees.").
47. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that "Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions
of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister").
48. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class
Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189,
1216–17 (1994) (citing McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61).
49. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (citations omitted).
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State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the
principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment."50 Thus, the
freedom of religious employers to choose their ministers is virtually
absolute—such employers are not even required to articulate the reasoning
behind their decisions.51
A religious employer’s use of the ministerial exception becomes
particularly troublesome when the employee who has suffered adverse
employment action is not a "minister" by title; instead, he or she might be a
principal, a teacher, or even a press secretary.52 In Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,53 the Fourth Circuit defined the
parameters of who may be considered a ministerial employee, stating that
"if the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered
clergy."54 The Rayburn court also noted that the ministerial exception to
Title VII "does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the
position."55 Since the Rayburn decision, a court’s analysis of which
employees constitute ministers has become, predictably, a rather complex
matter.
1. The "Primary Duties Test" and Inconsistencies in Its Application
Typically, courts decide whether an employee is a "minister" through
application of the "primary duties" test, which has its foundation in
Rayburn.56 This test leads to inconsistent results.57 For example, in
50. Id.
51. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1975 (explaining that the First Amendment protects
effectively all employment decisions that include religious judgments).
52. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 703–04 (7th
Cir. 2003) (deciding that a press secretary was a minister, and holding that the First
Amendment precluded the court’s jurisdiction).
53. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1170–72 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff’s sex and race discrimination claims, levied
against a church that denied the plaintiff a pastoral position, were barred by the religion
clauses of the First Amendment).
54. Id. at 1169.
55. Id. at 1168.
56. See Note, supra note 24, at 1776 (remarking that courts will only ask "whether an
employee’s job responsibilities render him ‘important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of
the church’" (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169)).
57. See id. at 1787–89 (identifying the problems associated with the application of the
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Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,58 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an elementary school teacher
was a minister, although twelve of his thirteen job duties were expressly
secular.59 The court found Clapper’s primary role to be "teaching and
spreading the Seventh-day Adventist faith and supervising and participating
in religious ritual and worship,"60 even though those activities consumed
only 10.6% of his time.61 According to the decision, "the quantity of time
an employee spends on religious matters must be considered alongside ‘the
degree of the church entity’s reliance upon such employee to indoctrinate
persons in its theology.’"62 The church’s dependence on Clapper to
indoctrinate his students in the Seventh-day Adventist faith ultimately
tipped the scales in favor of the ministerial exception.63
In contrast, in Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,64 the
Eastern District of New York held that an elementary school teacher at a
Seventh-day Adventist school did not meet the primary duties test and thus
did not qualify as a minister.65 Redhead is particularly relevant here,
because it involved a religious school’s termination of a pregnant teacher,
ostensibly because of her pregnancy.66 In Redhead, the court found that the
ministerial exception did not apply to the plaintiff’s Title VII pregnancy
and sex discrimination claims, because her teaching duties were primarily
secular.67 Though Redhead did teach a Bible class, much like Clapper, this
duty consumed only one hour per day, and her only other religious duty as a
teacher was to attend a yearly religious ceremony.68 Ultimately, the court
primary duties test).
58. Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998
WL 904528 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a former teacher’s Title VII
claim was barred because of the ministerial exception).
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id. at *7.
61. Id. at *4.
62. See Note, supra note 24, at 1788 n.75 (quoting Clapper, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL
904528, at *7).
63. See Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at *7.
64. See Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220–
24 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the ministerial exception did not apply, because the
terminated teacher’s duties were primarily secular, and that there existed a genuine question
of fact as to whether the motive for plaintiff’s dismissal was religious or secular).
65. See id. at 221 (describing the application of the primary duties test as fact-specific
and distinguishing its result from previous cases).
66. Id. at 214–16.
67. Id. at 221.
68. Id. at 214.
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determined that Redhead was not a minister, the excessive entanglement
challenges present in Clapper did not apply, and Redhead was permitted to
proceed with her Title VII claim.69
In rendering decisions such as Clapper and Redhead, courts often
apply the primary duties test with inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary
results.70 The results can devastate the case of a woman who was
terminated because of her pregnancy then deemed to be a "minister"
because potential entanglement concerns prohibit a court from examining
whether a religious employer engaged in activities prohibited by Title VII.
2. The Ministerial Exception: Stretched to Its Breaking Point?
Clapper and Redhead illustrate a developmental flaw in the ministerial
exception: courts have stretched it to its breaking point. In Caroline Mala
Corbin’s article Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law,71 the author explores the
expansion of the ministerial exception from its early narrow reach to its
current broad swath. Corbin questions whether courts have been loyal to
the original purpose of the ministerial exception, as stated in McClure v.
Salvation Army, which sought to protect church autonomy in choosing its
ministers because "[a]ny attempt by the civil courts to limit the church’s
choice of its religious representatives would constitute an impermissible
burden on the church’s First Amendment rights."72
Some courts have moved far beyond protecting such choices as the
Catholic Church’s hiring only male priests. The ministerial exception has
been used, for example, to eliminate a Jewish nursing home’s liability
under a Fair Labor Standards Act claim for unpaid overtime due to a
Kosher supervisor.73 Other courts have been more hesitant to expand the
reach of the ministerial exception, thereby limiting a religious
organization’s ability to use discriminatory employment practices.74 In its
69. Id. at 221, 224.
70. See Note, supra note 24, at 1788 (noting that the unpredictability leaves both
religious institutions and their employees unsure of how such lawsuits will be decided).
71. See generally, Corbin, supra note 37.
72. Id. at 1975 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 1976 (citing Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299,
301 (4th Cir. 2004)) (discussing a case in which a court held that the Mashgiach, or kosher
supervisor, of a predominantly Jewish nursing home was a minister for the purposes of
federal employment laws, and that the nursing home was a religious institution under the
ministerial exception, thereby barring the discrimination claim).
74. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D.
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1982 decision, E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Association,75 the
Ninth Circuit stated that "Congress’s purpose to end discrimination is
equally if not more compelling than other interests that have been held to
justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious conviction."76
Reflecting on McClure, the Pacific Press court referred to E.E.O.C. v.
Mississippi College,77 another Fifth Circuit case, and stated:
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit refused to broaden the McClure
exemption to include the faculty at Mississippi College, noting
that: "The College’s faculty and staff do not function as ministers. The
faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its
congregation. They neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful
nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine. That faculty
members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians
does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment
matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical
78
concern."

Though this definition of "minister" has largely given way to the broad
"primary duties" test, applying a narrower standard to determine whether a
teacher actually functions as a minister would lead to results becoming
more consistent, both with one another and with the ministerial exception’s
original purpose.
B. Statutory Religious Exemptions to Title VII
1. Amos and Analysis Under the First Amendment
Even if an employee fails the primary duties test, a school may still
attempt to classify its employment decision as outside the reach of Title
Cal. 1984) ("The School is entitled to hire only members of its faith for teaching positions
and the like, but may not, under the § 702 exemption, discriminate against its employees
thereafter.").
75. See E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a secretary was not a minister under McClure, and thus that her employer could
not avail itself of the ministerial exception).
76. Id. at 1280.
77. See E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485–86 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
the ministerial exception should be applied narrowly, and that it did not apply to the
relationship between a religious educational institution and its faculty), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981).
78. See Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d at 1278 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll.,
626 F.2d at 485).
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VII.79 Often this is done by articulating a religious reason for termination
and attempting to fit into one of the narrow written exemptions to Title
VII.80 These exemptions excuse religious employers from Title VII by
permitting them to employ only members of their own faith in their nonprofit activities. 81 In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,82 the Supreme Court upheld these
exemptions, stating that such a rule was constitutionally permissible and
"rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions."83 Yet, as the Ninth Circuit
stated in E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, "although
Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in favor of
members of their faith, religious employers are not immune from liability
for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or for retaliatory
actions against employees who exercise their rights under the statute."84 In
that case, for example, the court decided that although the wage disparity
between men and women at a religious publishing company was a sincere
79. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Tree of Life Christian Schs. 751 F. Supp. 700, 709 (S.D.
Ohio 1990) ("Tree of Life argues that to apply the Act and invalidate its head of household
allowance would violate its rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.").
80. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365–1367 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that Title VII exempts religious employers "only with respect to
discrimination based on religion, and then only with respect to persons hired to carry out the
employer’s ‘religious activities’"). The court held that a religious school’s stated reason for
the disparity in men’s and women’s wages—the religious belief that men, as heads of
households, should be paid more—was insufficient to exempt the school from liability for
sex discrimination. Id. at 1367.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) states that "[t]his subchapter shall not apply to an
employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities" (emphasis
added). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) states that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for a school . . . to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such
school . . . is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the
curriculum of such school . . . is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion"
(emphasis added).
82. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (holding that applying Title VII’s religious exemption
to a religious organization’s secular nonprofit activities was permissible under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
83. Id. at 339.
84. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
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reflection of religious beliefs, such a disparity still constituted
impermissible gender discrimination under Title VII.85
Courts find it difficult to make decisions similar to the holding in
E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press. In cases involving religious discrimination as
well as potential gender discrimination, they must interpret Title VII in a
way that gives credence to Title VII’s desire to remedy our nation’s "long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."86 At the same time, they
must neither endorse87 nor restrict88 the practice of religion, as the
Establishment and the Free Exercise clauses, respectively, require. The
Supreme Court’s Lemon test89 sets forth three factors for courts to examine
in determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’"90 Similarly, the Court
has examined three factors in determining whether a statute violates the
Free Exercise Clause: "(1) the magnitude of the statute’s impact upon the
exercise of the religious belief; (2) the existence of a compelling state
interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of the religious
85. See id. at 1277 ("We reject the argument that the exemption provided by section
702 applies to all actions taken by an employer with respect to an employee whose work is
connected with the organization’s ‘religious activities.’").
86. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (holding that classifications
based on sex are inherently suspect and deciding that the federal statute providing automatic
dependency status for wives of male uniformed service employees but requiring husbands of
female uniformed service employees to jump through administrative hoops to prove
dependency violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
87. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. "U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Bd.
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (holding that
a statute creating a special school district to encompass a religious village violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
88. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires that "Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. "U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that although Congress does
have the power to enact legislation enforcing the right to free exercise, that power may be
used only in preventative or remedial ways and cannot be used to substantively change the
right itself).
89. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) (holding that the Rhode Island
statute providing state aid to private schools was unconstitutional under the Establishment
and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, and setting out what became known as
the Lemon test).
90. Id. at 612–13.
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belief; and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the
statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state."91
Title VII is regularly scrutinized under these tests, and with varying results,
when a former employee files a pregnancy discrimination claim against a
religious employer.
2. Dolter, Vigars, and Application of the Statutory Exemptions
In Dolter v. Wahlert High School,92 the Northern District of Iowa was
faced with deciding whether examining an underlying claim of gender
discrimination, regardless of the presence of a stated religious reason for
termination, would violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment.93
Dolter had been an English teacher at Wahlert, a private Roman Catholic
high school.94 She was unmarried at the time of her employment and
became pregnant; subsequently, her contract was not renewed.95 The high
school cited her status as a pregnant unmarried woman as the reason her
contract was not renewed, and Dolter sued on the grounds of gender
discrimination.96
Wahlert High School claimed that because the school was a religious
one, the application of Title VII would result in excessive entanglement of
church and state as prohibited under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment.97 The court resolved the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rejecting Wahlert’s claim.98 It used the
91. E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
92. See Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270–271 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(holding that the application of Title VII to a former sectarian school teacher’s claim of sex
discrimination would not violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
93. See id. (holding that the application of Title VII to a former sectarian school
teacher’s claim of sex discrimination would not violate the religion clauses of the First
Amendment).
94. Id. at 267.
95. See id. ("In June, 1978, defendant refused to honor that contract and terminated her
employment allegedly on the grounds she was unmarried and pregnant.").
96. See id. (describing genesis of the suit).
97. Id. at 269–70 ("Defendant’s . . . assertion of Title VII jurisdiction over this case
would entail excessive entanglement of government with the religious mission of the school
is grounded on its essential argument that Ms. Dolter, as a Catholic lay teacher of English, is
significantly involved in the religious pedagogical ministry of the Catholic Church.").
98. Id. at 270–71 ("The court concludes, therefore, that its assertion of Title VII
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim of Sex discrimination would not entail excessive
entanglement in the religious mission of defendant’s school and would not be violative of
the religion clauses of the first amendment.").
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two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations
Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,99 to eliminate both Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause concerns.100 First, the court asked whether
Congress had "clearly expressed" its intention to have Title VII apply to
religious schools; and second, it asked whether Title VII’s "antidiscrimination strictures," when applied to religious schools, would result in
excessive entanglement between church and state, thereby violating the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.101 The court found that Congress
had intended all employers, including private religious ones, to be bound by
the standards set by Title VII unless an articulated exemption applied,102
and reasoned that its examination of Dolter’s case would not require it to
"pass judgment on the legitimacy of its religious teachings, its moral
precepts and the administration of its religious pedagogical ministry."103
Importantly, the Dolter court stated:
The only issues the court need decide are whether those moral precepts,
to the extent they constitute essential conditions for continued
employment, are applied equally to defendant’s male and female
teachers; and whether Ms. Dolter was in fact discharged Only [sic]
because she was pregnant rather than because she obviously had pre104
marital sexual intercourse in violation of the defendant’s moral code.

It noted that to construe Title VII "to exempt all forms of
discrimination in sectarian schools would itself raise First Amendment
problems since it would imply the government’s special preference of
sectarian schools over nonsectarian schools."105 Though this Establishment
99. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that
the National Labor Relations Act did not authorize the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction over
teachers at sectarian schools—such an act would violate the religion clauses of the First
Amendment).
100. See id. ("The First Amendment, of course, is a limitation on the power of
Congress. Thus, if we were to conclude that the Act granted the challenged jurisdiction over
these teachers we would be required to decide whether that was constitutionally permissible
under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.").
101. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see also Dolter v.
Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 268 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (applying the standard set forth
in NLRB, 440 U.S. at 499).
102. See Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 266, 269 (noting that although Congress clearly
intended to allow religious employers to hire only members of their own religion, "[t]here is
no indication in the legislative history that when Congress enacted the 1972 amendment it
also intended to exempt sectarian schools from liability for [s]ex discrimination.").
103. Id. at 270.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 269 (citing King’s Garden v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54–57 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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Clause argument generally has not been used to support Title VII’s
application to religious schools’ stating a religious reason for an adverse
employment action, the decision signals a readiness by courts to limit the
religious exemptions to Title VII when otherwise straightforward cases of
actionable discrimination are present.106
Whether a court could examine the religious justification for blatant
sex discrimination was again at issue in Vigars v. Valley Christian Center
of Dublin, California.107 Valley Christian Center terminated Vigars when
she became pregnant while in the process of annulling one marriage and
entering into another.108 In a motion to dismiss, the school claimed that
Vigars had been terminated because her pregnancy outside of marriage was
inconsistent with the beliefs of the church.109 Because the focus of the
adverse employment action was her pregnancy and not her sexual behavior,
the court determined that the school had engaged in per se pregnancy
discrimination that could not be made permissible through use of a religious
exemption.110 The court denied the motion to dismiss, and Valley
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, changing its defense.111
Valley modified its claim based on the decision in Dolter v. Wahlert,
proffering that it was Vigars’ adulterous relationship with the man who was

106. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class
Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189,
1221 (1994) (suggesting that the Dolter decision indicates that "governmental
accommodation of nonreligious discrimination by a religious entity would constitute a
prohibited establishment of religion").
107. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (denying summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could prove that she
had been fired because of her pregnancy). The court stated that "[t]he PDA makes it clear
that this is per se sex discrimination. In enacting the PDA, Congress expressed its intention
to apply Title VII to just such a case as this." Id.
108. See id. at 804 ("[S]he was fired, [defendants] now allege, because the school
learned that she was involved in an adulterous relationship (i.e., sexual relations with her
‘new’ husband before she was divorced from her ‘old’ husband).").
109. See id. (referring to her termination letter, which "states without equivocation that
the reason for her termination was the fact that she was ‘pregnant without benefit of
marriage,’ which condition was inconsistent with the religious values of the church and
school").
110. See id. at 807–08 ("[O]nly women can ever be fired for being pregnant without
benefit of marriage. Thus, women would be subject to termination for something that men
would not be, and that is sex discrimination, regardless of the justification put forth for the
disparity." (emphasis in original)).
111. Id. at 804 (describing the defendant’s change in tactics).
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the father of her child, not her pregnancy outside of marriage, which served
as the grounds for her termination.112
In resolving the motion for summary judgment, the court stated,
"defendants’ ‘new’ position—that plaintiff was fired for adultery, and not
on account of her pregnancy—would not give rise to a Title VII claim."113
However, the court would not turn a blind eye to the defendant’s previously
stated reason for termination, and looked to precedent to determine whether
a proffered religious reason for termination could be examined for
It stated that "[t]he Supreme Court’s decision [in
pretext.114
Amos] . . . simply does not state that all employment decisions of a
religious entity are off limits from Title VII, so that churches are free to
discriminate on the basis of sex or race while other non-religious employers
are not."115 The court recognized the potential for sex discrimination in
cases such as this one, because it is only women who bear the physical
manifestation of sexual activity, and stated that if Title VII were not
applied:
[W]omen would be subject to termination for something that men would
not be, and that is sex discrimination, regardless of the justification put
forth for the disparity. The fact that defendants’ dislike of pregnancy
outside of marriage stems from a religious belief may be relevant to the
Court’s First Amendment analysis, but it does not automatically exempt
116
the termination decision from Title VII scrutiny.

Ultimately, in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
the court decided that Congress had intended Title VII to apply to

112. See id. ("However, in their summary judgment motion, defendants—for the first
time—assert that plaintiff’s termination had nothing to do with her pregnancy. On the
contrary, she was fired, they now allege, because the school learned that she was involved in
an adulterous relationship. (i.e., sexual relations with her ‘new’ husband before she was
divorced from her ‘old’ husband).").
113. Id. at 805.
114. See id. ("[D]efendants’ ‘old’ position—that plaintiff was fired because she was
pregnant . . . raises the possibility of sex discrimination. If Title VII does not apply to that
decision, there would . . . be no material fact in dispute . . . [P]laintiff would not be entitled
to relief under Title VII in either event."). The court goes on to state, "If Title VII does
apply, however, the dispute as to the true basis for plaintiff’s termination becomes material."
Id. Therefore, the court looked to precedent to determine whether Title VII applies to the
school’s decision to terminate the plaintiff based on her pregnancy and whether application
of Title VII overcomes First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 805–10.
115. Id. at 807 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original).
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employment decisions based on sex, even when made by religious
employers.117
3. A Split Among the Circuits
This narrow reading of the religious exemptions to Title VII is not
common to all the circuits.118 The Vigars court was persuaded primarily by
Ninth Circuit cases, but based its narrow reading of the religious
exemptions to Title VII on cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits.119 In contrast to those circuits, the Third Circuit in Little v.
Wuerl,120 decided that Title VII could not regulate a Catholic school’s
decision not to renew a teacher’s contract because of her remarriage.121 The
court decided that examining the school’s employment decisions through
the lens of Title VII would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment
clauses of the First Amendment,122 and concluded that Congress had not
intended Title VII’s scope to be so broad.123 The Third Circuit recently
117. See id. at 809 (stating that Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause
because its primary purpose is secular, and its primary effect is not to promote or inhibit
religion, but to render illegal the vast majority of sex, race, and national origin-based
discrimination). The court also found that Title VII did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because it is a "secular, neutral statute which, in this case, incidentally has a profound impact
on defendants’ free exercise of their religion. " Id.
118. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding a school’s decision
not to renew a teacher’s employment contract was exempt from Title VII); see also CurayCramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a
former teacher’s Title VII claim was barred because such a claim would require the court to
examine church doctrine, which would violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
119. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807–08
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing to Ninth Circuit cases as well as the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
Rayburn and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Mississippi College).
120. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a school’s
decision not to renew a teacher’s employment contract was exempt from Title VII).
121. See id. ("We recognize that Congress intended Title VII to free individual workers
from religious prejudice. But we are also persuaded that Congress intended the explicit
exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain communities
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal practices . . . ."). The court broadly
interpreted the religious exemptions to Title VII, stating that Wuerl’s discriminatory action
against Little would fit within the exemptions, even though Little was hired as a Protestant.
Id.
122. See id. at 947 ("Application of this prohibition to the Parish’s decision would be
constitutionally suspect because it would arguably violate both the free exercise clause and
the establishment clause of the first amendment." (emphasis in original)).
123. See id. at 951 ("We conclude that the application of Title VII’s prohibition against
religious discrimination to the Parish’s decision not to rehire Little would raise substantial
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considered and followed this holding in Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline
Academy of Wilmington,124 a case involving gender discrimination in a
sectarian school, and cited to Little v. Wuerl for the proposition that a
religious entity’s religious justification for discrimination could not be
examined for pretext.125 The Curay-Cramer court stated:
[I]nquiry into the employer’s religious mission is not only likely, but
inevitable, because the specific claim is that the employee’s beliefs or
practices make her unfit to advance that mission. It is difficult to
imagine an area of the employment relationship less fit for scrutiny by
the secular courts. Even if the employer ultimately prevails, the process
126
of review itself might be excessive entanglement.

Thus, the circuits split regarding whether the religious exemptions to
Title VII should be construed broadly or narrowly.127 The Supreme Court
has failed to address the issue of whether a religious entity’s stated religious
justification for discrimination can be examined for pretext.128
III. Arguments in the Alternative: Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
Typically, if a religious employer fails to establish that the pregnant
teacher whom it terminated was a minister, and fails to establish that
application of Title VII to its religiously-based employment decision would
constitutional questions. We further determine that neither Title VII’s plain language, nor its
legislative history, demonstrates Congress’ affirmative intent that Title VII apply here.").
124. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130, 142 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that a former teacher’s Title VII claim was barred because such a claim
would require the court to examine church doctrine, which would violate the religion clauses
of the First Amendment).
125. See id. at 138–39 ("[W]e concluded that applying Title VII to a claim of religious
discrimination by an employee terminated from a Catholic school for marrying in violation
of canon law would raise serious constitutional questions." (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d
944, 950 (3d Cir. 1991)).
126. Id. at 139 (quoting Wuerl, 929 F.2d at 949).
127. See E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 848 F. Supp. 899, 899–900 (D.
Haw. 1993) (vacating an order granting summary judgment to the defendant and granting
partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability because according to the Ninth
Circuit panel, defendant’s ‘Protestant’ hiring requirement is not protected by any Title VII
exemption). The court points out that the Ninth Circuit has chosen to construe the Title VII
exemption narrowly, while all other circuits that have considered the issue have construed it
broadly. Id.
128. See id. at 900 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has declined to
consider the conflict between circuits regarding whether the Title VII exemption should be
construed narrowly or broadly).
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raise any serious First Amendment issues, then it moves on to the
nonreligious justifications.129 Specifically, schools state that the terminated
teacher failed to satisfy a BFOQ for her position.130 This BFOQ defense
was established in the Civil Rights Act of 1964;131 the standard for
establishing that a particular characteristic is a BFOQ was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson.132 In that case, the Court decided
that employers could purposefully discriminate in their hiring practices if
the essential duties of the job warranted it, but also cautioned that any
employer who asserted this BFOQ defense would bear a heavy burden.133
In the case of pregnancy discrimination against a sectarian school
teacher, the school will usually assert that the teacher failed to satisfy a
BFOQ either because she failed to abide by a particular moral code134 or
129. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 ("An
employer may justify discrimination otherwise prohibited by Title VII by showing either a
business necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).").
130. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (establishing the
bona fide occupational qualification as a defense). The text of the defense, found in
§ 2000e-2(e)(1), provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for
employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership
or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship
or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any
such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.
Id. (emphasis added).
131. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (extending voting
rights and outlawing racial segregation in schools, at the workplace, and by facilities that
serve the general public).
132. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335–37 (1977) (holding that a
correctional facility’s height and weight requirements for job applicants discriminated
against women, stating that the requirements were not job related, but deciding that the
height and weight requirements did serve as a bona fide occupational qualification because
of particular circumstances).
133. See id. at 333–34 (referencing cases in which the BFOQ defense was narrowly
interpreted and establishing that the BFOQ exception was meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex); see also Vigars,
805 F. Supp. at 808 (stating that an employer seeking to establish a BFOQ defense bears a
heavy burden).
134. See cases cited infra note 139 (citing cases in which the employer accused an
employee of failing to abide by the moral code required by the school because she engaged
in premarital sex and became pregnant, and therefore failed to satisfy a BFOQ).
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because she failed in her capacity as a role model.135 Though the two are
often conflated, they are actually distinct, and their usage as defense
mechanisms has quite different implications. Claiming that a woman failed
to satisfy a BFOQ because she didn’t abide by a written moral code is
relatively straightforward: because she failed to follow the rules laid out in
her employment contract, employee handbook, or manual, she disqualified
herself with her behavior.136 This is, in its simplest form, a breach of
contract claim, and if it is enforced equally across the sexes, then it does not
appear unfair.137 Claiming that a woman failed to satisfy a BFOQ because
she did not serve as a role model is a much more complex argument. There
are no set rules for a role model to follow, and what constitutes a role model
in the context of an employee at a religious school varies greatly among
schools.138
A. Employment Contracts and Written Expectations of Morality
Religious schools often ask their employees to abide by a particular
moral code, with some requiring that employees sign documents such as a
"Teacher-Minister Contract" or a "Religious Statement."139 Courts are
135. See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 703–05 (1987)
(holding that the "role model rule" put in place by the staff to discourage unmarried
pregnancies was a BFOQ); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802,
808–09 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment because
the primary function of the employee was to be a librarian and not a role model, and
therefore the school’s defense that she did not satisfy a BFOQ failed).
136. See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 411 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting that the faculty handbook plaintiff was given after being hired required
teachers provide "a Christian example for the students" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137. See id. at 414 (holding that plaintiff’s Title VII claim failed in part because
defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that it had terminated both males and females
that had engaged in extramarital sexual relationships in violation of the school’s moral
code).
138. See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1377, 1384 (1996) ("When individuals invoke the concept of role model, they refer to a
diverse set of political virtues (positive role models) and vices (negative role models).").
139. See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a pregnant teacher who engaged in premarital sex signed a "Teacher-Minister
Contract" and acknowledged that her position required her to "build and live Christian
community, integrate learning and faith, and instill a sense of mission in her students"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that an unmarried, pregnant teacher signed a "Religious Statement"
on her application for employment, agreeing that her "temperament and lifestyle" were "in
accordance with the will of God and The Holy Scripture," and that she was expected to be a
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usually willing to enforce these contracts, if the school can prove that it
enforced the contract’s requirements equally across the sexes.140 The fact
that a religious school requires its employees to sign a contract obligating
them to abide by certain religious rules does not exempt the school from the
mandates of Title VII.141 As a result, the school must show that it
terminates male employees along with female employees in enforcement of
its moral policies.142 This is particularly difficult, considering that the
majority of sins do not present themselves with hairy palms, growing noses,
crossed eyes, or anything else that would make one’s sins obvious—except
for the one instance in which there is glaring evidence of moral
transgression: pregnancy outside of marriage.143
Whether abiding by a "moral code" could be a BFOQ was an
additional consideration in Dolter v. Wahlert High School.144 Wahlert, a
Catholic school, claimed that if the court were to deny its religious
exemption and to decide that the case should be judged under Title VII, a
BFOQ defense would still be available because the school had a right to set
standards of morality to which employees must conform.145 It claimed that
teachers such as Ms. Dolter were required to abide by the moral and
religious standards set by the Roman Catholic Church, one of which was

role model).
140. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414 (deciding that, in a teacher’s sex discrimination case in
which she claimed her termination was based on her pregnancy, the school could not be held
liable because it applied its policy against extramarital sex equally against men and women).
141. See Ganzy, 995 F.Supp. at 348 (stating that although inquiry by the courts into the
religious faith required by a religious organization of its employees is constitutionally
barred, application of Title VII in cases of gender discrimination does not violate the First
Amendment, and therefore religious codes must apply to both male and female employees).
142. See id. ("Religious codes of morality must be applied equally to male and female
teachers.").
143. See id. at 344 ("Women can become pregnant. Men cannot. It is therefore
sometimes easier to enforce restrictions on sexual activity against a woman employee.").
The opinion goes on to state that "[n]evertheless, if a woman is dismissed from a teaching
position in a religious school because she is pregnant, rather than because she had sexual
relations, state and federal prohibitions on gender discrimination are violated." Id.
144. See Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(denying defendant school’s motion for summary judgment in part because an issue of
material fact existed as to whether the teacher’s pregnancy entitled the school to dismiss her
under the BFOQ exception to Title VII).
145. See id. ("[D]efendant contends that it was entitled to impose upon its teachers a
code of religious moral conduct and to expect them to follow, in their personal life and
behavior, the recognized moral precepts of the Catholic Church. . . . [S]uch code and
precepts constitute a bona fide occupational qualification . . . .").
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abstaining from sex outside of marriage.146 Under this defense, the school
believed that its discrimination was justified because Ms. Dolter violated
the school’s moral code with her actions and her resulting pregnancy.147
The Northern District of Iowa resolved the motion for summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.148 It stated that restrictions specifically
targeted at pregnancy are per se gender discrimination, because biology
limits pregnancy to women,149 but said "[t]he court has no substantive
quarrel with the possible merits of defendant’s contention that it may be
entitled to impose a code of moral conduct as a bfoq."150 However, the
court went on to state:
[D]efendant’s asserted bfoq appears [to] relate to more religious and/or
moral qualifications than to sexual qualifications. To that extent, even
where such code of conduct truly constitutes a legitimate religious bfoq,
the law nonetheless requires that it not be applied discriminatorily on the
basis of sex; that is, unequally to defendant’s male and female lay
151
teacher employees.

In this case, the judge could find no instances in which men who had
engaged in premarital sex had adverse employment actions taken against
them, and so found that Ms. Dolter’s termination could have been the result
of gender discrimination.152 The court noted that the actions of the school
raised suspicion about whether the BFOQ defense was indeed pretextual, an
issue brought up in many following cases.153
Sixteen years after Dolter, a sectarian school successfully established
that adherence to a moral code could be a BFOQ—and that such a BFOQ
could be enforced equally across the genders—in Boyd v. Harding
146. See id. at 270 ("[D]efendant asserts its right to impose upon all its teacher
employees a code of moral conduct including the proscription of pre-marital sexual
intercourse.").
147. See id. at 271 ("Defendant concludes that it was plaintiff’s alleged failure to meet
such bfoq relating to morality that was the true reason for her discharge and not her sex.").
148. See id. (denying summary judgment to defendant school).
149. See id. at 270 n.4 ("The court certainly can take judicial notice of the fact that
under present physiological laws of nature women are the only members of the human
population who can become pregnant.").
150. Id. at 271.
151. Id.
152. See id. (referring to plaintiff’s affidavit, which asserted that she had knowledge
that other single teachers, known to have violated defendant’s asserted code of conduct by
engaging in premarital sex, were not discharged as she was).
153. See id. ("This . . . goes to the issue whether defendant’s asserted bfoq defense is
pretextual . . . .").
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Academy.154 Andrea Boyd was a teacher at the preschool of Harding
Academy, which was affiliated with the Church of Christ.155 The faculty
handbook given to all teachers specified that in addition to professional
ability, Christian character was the basis for hiring teachers at Harding, and
that every teacher was required in all actions to be a Christian example for
the students.156 In 1992, Boyd had a miscarriage while unmarried; she told
her director about it, but was not terminated.157 Only in 1993, when Boyd
again became pregnant while still unmarried, was she fired.158 Boyd’s
supervisor initially told her that she was terminated because she was
"pregnant and unwed," but later stated that she actually meant that Boyd
was terminated because she had broken the school’s moral code by
engaging in extramarital sex.159
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
summary judgment award in favor of the defendant, agreeing that Boyd
could not establish a prima facie case because she did not adhere to the
moral codes of the school, which Harding had established as a BFOQ of her
job.160 An essential fact that sets the Boyd case apart from Dolter is that in
Boyd, the school was able to successfully prove a qualification set forth in
Dolter: that a school’s "code of conduct be applied equally to both
sexes."161 It accomplished this by showing that Boyd’s termination was not
the first occurrence of teacher termination at Harding because of
extramarital sex, and that men as well as women had come under scrutiny
and been fired because of their private sexual conduct.162 To disprove the
154. See Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the judgment of the district court that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof
in establishing a Title VII gender discrimination claim when defendant articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination by claiming that she was
fired for extramarital sex rather than for being pregnant).
155. Id. at 411.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 412.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 412 n.2 ("Rubio testified that she was trying to be ‘as gentle as [she] could’
with Boyd and that by saying that plaintiff was pregnant and unwed, she actually meant that
plaintiff had engaged in sex outside of marriage.").
160. See id. at 414–15 ("[T]he district court was correct in holding that defendant
articulated a . . . non-discriminatory reason by stating that it fired plaintiff . . . for engaging
in sex outside of marriage . . . Boyd did not meet her burden to prove . . . that this articulated
reason was actually a pretext for illegal discrimination.").
161. Id. at 414 (citing Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa
1980)).
162. Id.
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contention that Boyd was fired because of her pregnancy, which would be a
violation of the PDA, the principal cited several examples of married
women who became pregnant while teaching and showed the school’s
compliance with the law in these cases.
Whether such a BFOQ can ever realistically be enforced equally
across the genders is a matter still up for debate, however.163 In Boyd, the
President of Harding Academy came to know of other behaviors in
opposition to the school’s moral code, and thus was able to punish those
who did not abide by it, because of gossip.164 Under these circumstances, a
male teacher who engaged in extramarital sex resulting in pregnancy, but
who did not discuss his behavior with others, would be protected from
adverse employment actions. In contrast, a female teacher who engaged in
the same behavior and with the same results would be at risk for
termination, regardless of whether she told anyone about her actions.
Because extramarital sex may sometimes publicly proclaim itself through
pregnancy, a female teacher at Harding Academy may be unable either to
keep her private life private or to keep her job. A woman’s inability to keep
private her extramarital sex resulting in pregnancy, coupled with a man’s
ability to do just that, gives men a clear upper hand in avoiding moralitybased termination. Such a distinction is gender discrimination, and should
not be tolerated.
B. The "Role Model Defense" and Unwritten Expectations of Morality
After a supposed erosion of morals took place in the 1950’s and
1960’s,165 a greater number of parents each year chose to take their children
out of secular public schools and to place them in sectarian private schools,
where they felt comforted by the fact that their children would be taught by
people with a shared system of beliefs and values.166 But for a private
school tuition, parents often expect much more than just a teacher of
163. Rachel Knight, Comment, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed
Mothers, Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481,
511–13 (2004).
164. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1996).
165. See Knight, supra note 163, at 486 ("As the rigid social norms of the 1950s and
early 1960s eroded and collapsed, allowing for greater expression of identity and
individualism, a simultaneous rising tide of ‘moral panic’ swelled up.").
166. Cf. Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(describing defendant school promoting to parents that it provides a "Christ-centered
education" (internal citations omitted)).
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Algebra or Literature—they want a teacher who will serve as a role model
for their children.167 The Supreme Court recognized this in Ambach v.
Norwick,168 a decision that emphasized that a "teacher serves as a role
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values."169 Since Ambach, schools have used this concept
of a role model in their defensive strategy, to bolster up the termination of
teachers whose failure to live up to a moral standard is heralded by
pregnancy. This "role model defense" becomes problematic when it
appears in its "hypnotic though frivolous shape, to divert attention from
problems of power and authority and social reality in general."170 It is
"hypnotic" when used to romanticize the relationship between teacher and
child, such as one author’s claim that "[e]xcept for sex, education is the
most intimate of human contacts. Other than marriage, it is the most loving
and momentous of personal relations."171 When schools put such a strong
emphasis on the role model relationship between teacher and student, it is
easy to see how a court’s attention could be diverted from the very real
problem of gender discrimination in religious schools. In addition, often
schools claim that their teachers should be "comprehensive" role models,
demonstrating how a person of a particular belief system should live every
part of his or her life.172 But this defense does not comport with social
reality. Though schools claim that their teachers should serve as
comprehensive, full-time role models for their students, it would be difficult
for any school to enforce this policy in a gender-neutral way that does not
infringe on the privacy rights of its teachers.173 Still, courts are sometimes
167. Id.
168. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–81 (1979) (holding that the New York
Education Law provision that prohibited teachers who are not citizens of the United States
from obtaining certification to teach public school met the rational basis test required for
discrimination against aliens, and emphasizing the role model status of school teachers).
169. Id. at 78–79.
170. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1377, 1384 (1996) (quoting C. WRIGHT MILLS, On Knowledge and Power, in POWER,
POLITICS AND PEOPLE: THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT MILLS 599, 612 (Irving L.
Horowitz ed., 1963)) (exposing the problems with the role model defense).
171. John Lachs & Shirley M. Lachs, Education and the Power of the
State: Reconceiving Some Problems and Their Solutions, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS 235, 237 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989).
172. See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1377, 1393–94 (defining comprehensive role models by stating that they possess two
common characteristics: they spend a great deal of time with and exert power over the
young people who will likely look up to them).
173. For example, though a Catholic school may terminate a teacher for publicly
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swayed by the patriarchal arguments of the schools and agree that acting as
a role model, abiding by the moral codes of the religious institution, can be
a BFOQ.
This was the case in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.,174 an Eighth
Circuit decision in which the court decided that a policy requiring
termination of single staff members who became pregnant or caused
pregnancy was permissible.175 In that case, the court held that this "role
model rule" was justified both as a business necessity and as a BFOQ.176
The unique circumstances of that case differentiate it from cases of
pregnant school teachers. In Chambers, the staff members’ primary aim
was to serve as role models and to illustrate all the options that are available
to young women, not to teach students a secular subject or even to
indoctrinate them with a particular set of religious beliefs.177 The staff
viewed unmarried pregnancy as a serious limiting factor on the success of
the young women whom the club sought to promote, thought that the
presence of unmarried pregnant staff members would implicitly condone
pregnancy without the benefit of marriage, and together decided to sign an
agreement that unmarried pregnancy would be a termination event.178
This "role model" defense failed in Vigars v. Valley Christian
Center.179 In that case, the defendant argued that Vigars, a librarian, was
proclaiming her pro-choice sentiments, Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington,
450 F. 3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006), and the Boy Scouts may prohibit from being assistant
scoutmaster a man who publicly proclaimed his homosexuality, Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), these policies are difficult to enforce when members of different
sexes are not similarly situated with regard to the ability to keep one’s views and actions
private. Though a woman may try to hide her unmarried pregnancy, her swelling belly
publicly proclaims her fornication. A school would have to work much harder to discover a
quiet man’s similar transgression.
174. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704–05 (1987) (holding
that the "role model rule" put in place by the staff to discourage unmarried pregnancies was
a bona fide occupational qualification).
175. See id. at 699 n.2 (laying out the policy prohibiting unmarried pregnancies, which
was contained in the "Major Club Rules," and states: "The following are not permitted and
such acts may result in immediate discharge: . . . 11. Negative role modeling for Girls Club
Members to include such things as single parent pregnancies").
176. Id. at 703–05.
177. Id. at 701.
178. Id. at 701–02.
179. Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808–09 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (rejecting the "role model" defense in which it was unclear "how central her
moral life was to her job as librarian, whether or not she was truly expected to act as a role
model in the Chambers sense, and what impact her pregnancy truly had on her ability to
perform either of those functions").
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required to serve as a role model for students at Valley, a parochial school,
and thus moral character and "non-pregnant out of wedlock" status was a
BFOQ.180 While the court recognized the precedential value of Chambers,
it distinguished that case by emphasizing that the Omaha Girls Club
employees’ "function was to act as role models for young girls."181 Though
Vigars was required to sign a statement of faith, pledging that she would
commit herself to instilling fundamentalist Christian values in the students
with whom she interacted, and would commit herself to a fundamentalist
Christian lifestyle, her primary function was not to be a role model—it was
to be a librarian.182 The Vigars court stated that "[a]lthough the analogy [to
Chambers] is tempting, it is ultimately not persuasive because it loses sight
of the very narrow focus of the BFOQ and business necessity defenses."183
The decision even went so far as to state that in order for a quality to be
considered a BFOQ, "the person’s job must depend upon the discriminatory
characteristic."184 The school also put forth the weak defense that people
would be "upset" that the church had "refused to stand up for its religious
doctrine" as challenged by Vigars.185 The court responded to this by stating
that "it is clear that fellow employees’ and customers’ ‘preferences’ do not
constitute BFOQ’s for sex discrimination any more than they constitute
BFOQ’s for race discrimination."186 Though the court did not address the
issue of whether serving as a role model could ever be a BFOQ for Vigars’
job, because it was deciding only a summary judgment motion, it certainly
made obvious that the school would have an uphill battle in arguing this
defense.
IV. Conclusion
Though sectarian schools continue to terminate their pregnant,
unmarried teachers, these women rarely lose their pregnancy discrimination
suits, and should in fact have an even greater rate of success than they
currently enjoy. Because teachers are not "ministers" in the traditional
180. Id. at 808.
181. Id. (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 804 (describing the pledges that employees of the school were required to
make upon their hiring).
183. Id. at 808.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 808 n.4.
186. Id.

560

16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. SOC. JUST. 529 (2010)

sense, as explored in McClure, the schools that employ them should not be
able to invoke the ministerial exception and thus skirt legitimate issues of
pregnancy discrimination. Similarly, schools invoking other religious
exemptions to Title VII should be required to open up their justifications to
challenges of pretext, as articulated by the Vigars Ninth Circuit court in its
analysis of the congressional record.187
In addition, though a requirement of moral behavior or adherence to a
"role model" status may be justifiable as a BFOQ, such BFOQs are
impossible to enforce without preference for the male gender. As the court
dryly noted in Dolter, "under present physiological laws of nature women
are the only members of the human population who can become
pregnant."188 Men and women will never be "similarly situated" with
respect to morality requirements such as the ones these private schools
claim to require, because women are biologically more disposed to show
the outward manifestations of what a private religious school might view as
immoral behavior. Because of this, the nondiscriminatory BFOQ defense
that was the lynchpin of Harding’s argument in Boyd can never truly exist,
and so it should never succeed.
In the Boyd case it should have been impossible for the school to assert
that morality as a BFOQ was enforced equally across gender lines,
defendant should have lost its summary judgment motion. Under those
circumstances the plaintiff would have most likely succeeded in her claim,
because the school’s religious justification for her termination could easily
be established as pretextual. Because Boyd was not terminated when she
miscarried, losing a pregnancy that was the result of extramarital sex, and
was terminated when her second extramarital pregnancy became obvious,
she could claim that her termination was not the result of the school’s
enforcing its moral code but was instead the result of her ongoing status as
a pregnant unmarried woman.189 Boyd’s supervisor even said in her
testimony that at the time of the miscarriage "she thought to herself at the
time that if Boyd had been pregnant, she would have had to terminate
her."190 It should have been obvious to the Boyd court that Harding viewed
187. See id. at 807 ("The legislative history of these . . . exemptions indicates
that . . . although Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in favor of
members of their faith, [they] are not immune from liability for discrimination based
on . . . sex . . . ." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
188. Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
189. See Knight, supra note 163, at 512–13 (2004) (noting that her miscarriage
provided as much evidence of extramarital sexual activity as her subsequent pregnancy).
190. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1996)
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Boyd’s pregnancy, not her private sexual activities, as disqualifying her
from her position.
Analysis of the "role model" defense leads to a similar conclusion.
While schools expect their teachers to be comprehensive role models for
their students, a woman’s unique ability to become pregnant puts her in a
position where disqualification as a role model is inherently suspect.
Though schools may claim that all teachers are subject to equal scrutiny of
their private lives, in order to ensure that they live up to their role model
status, gender-neutral scrutiny is simply impossible. While schools may
emphasize that teachers are role models who are expected to abide by
certain religious doctrines, these statements should never persuade a
court—a woman’s rights under the PDA should be weighted far more
heavily.
These were the approaches successfully taken by the NYLCU in the
more recent case referenced at the beginning of this Note, which was settled
out of court.191 The McCusker case indicates that until the Supreme Court
decides the open issues as detailed in this Note, sectarian schools will
continue to push the boundaries of the ministerial and other religious
exemptions, as well as the boundaries of BFOQs. Ultimately, when the
Court addresses these issues, particularly if it does so in the context of
pregnancy discrimination claims regarding a teacher’s termination from a
sectarian school, it should decide in favor of women—Title VII requires no
less.

(emphasis added).
191. See NYCLU Defends, supra note 6.

